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Decision Science: From Ramsey to Dual Process Theories

Publiceringsår: 2010
Språk: Engelska
Sidor: 129-143
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: Synthese
Volym: 172
Nummer: 1
Dokumenttyp: Artikel
Förlag: Synthese
Ytterligare information: This is a draft version. The article is available at Synthese's web site online first: http://www.springerlink.com/content/pm5766236j327277/

Sammanfattning

The hypothesis that human reasoning and decision-making can be roughly modeled by Expected Utility Theory has been at the core of decision science. Accumulating evidence has led researchers to modify the hypothesis. One of the latest additions to the field is Dual Process theory, which attempts to explain variance between participants and tasks when it comes to deviations from Expected Utility Theory. It is argued that Dual Process theories at this point cannot replace previous theories, since they, among other things, lack a firm conceptual framework, and have no means of producing independent evidence for their case.

Disputation

Nyckelord

  • Philosophy and Religion
  • Medicine and Health Sciences
  • Social Sciences
  • decision science
  • decision theory
  • human reasoning
  • decision-making
  • dual process theory
  • rationality
  • prospect theory
  • economic man
  • Ramsey
  • normative man
  • expected utility

Övriga

  • Swedish Research Council
  • Riksbankens Jubileumsfond
  • Vårdalinstitutet i Lund
Published
Yes
  • ISSN: 1573-0964
  • ISSN: 0039-7857

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