Nonlinear Taxation and Punishment
Författare
Summary, in English
The paper analyzes nonlinear tax schedules that are identified by maximizing a welfare function represented by a weighted summation of net utilities over a set of n ≥ 3 differing individuals. It is demonstrated that some of the feasible and Pareto efficient tax schedules that satisfy self‐selection can only be identified by maximizing a welfare function of the above form if (at least) one of the individuals in the economy is assigned a negative weight.
Avdelning/ar
Publiceringsår
2007
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
49-58
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
International Journal of Economic Theory
Volym
3
Issue
1
Länkar
Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
Wiley-Blackwell
Ämne
- Economics
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 1742-7355