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The Demand for Information Services and the Market Structure

Publiceringsår: 2002
Språk: Engelska
Sidor: 155-183
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: Journal of Economics
Volym: 77
Nummer: 2
Dokumenttyp: Artikel
Förlag: Springer

Sammanfattning

Uninformed buyers' demand for statistical screening between privately informed sellers is studied in a fixed price market. A single buyer will screen more extensively than would two or more buyers, since in the latter case buyers realize that sellers will be attracted to buyers with the most favorable screening policy (i.e., not to screen at all). This result is robust to some but not all types of modifications in the model. For instance, information quality differences in the sense of Blackwell will reinforce this effect. Furthermore, in equilibrium only the best information service will be used.

Disputation

Nyckelord

  • Business and Economics
  • screening
  • information service
  • market behavior

Övriga

Published
Yes
  • ISSN: 1617-7134

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