Webbläsaren som du använder stöds inte av denna webbplats. Alla versioner av Internet Explorer stöds inte längre, av oss eller Microsoft (läs mer här: * https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Var god och använd en modern webbläsare för att ta del av denna webbplats, som t.ex. nyaste versioner av Edge, Chrome, Firefox eller Safari osv.

The Demand for Information Services and the Market Structure

Författare

Summary, in English

Uninformed buyers' demand for statistical screening between privately informed sellers is studied in a fixed price market. A single buyer will screen more extensively than would two or more buyers, since in the latter case buyers realize that sellers will be attracted to buyers with the most favorable screening policy (i.e., not to screen at all). This result is robust to some but not all types of modifications in the model. For instance, information quality differences in the sense of Blackwell will reinforce this effect. Furthermore, in equilibrium only the best information service will be used.

Publiceringsår

2002

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

155-183

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Journal of Economics

Volym

77

Issue

2

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Springer

Ämne

  • Economics

Nyckelord

  • screening
  • information service
  • market behavior

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 1617-7134