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Genetic Information and Investment in Human Capital

Författare

Summary, in English

In a game of incomplete information we analyze the consequences of giving an employer access to imperfect genetic information about his employees. The employer chooses whether to invest in the employee and the employee chooses a life style. We derive the condition for markets of information services to exist and the conditions for when it is beneficial to the various parties. In one specification of the game, the mere introduction of the information service may change the employee's choice of health behavior, which means that the value of genetic information may be negative to the employer.

Publiceringsår

1997

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

435-452

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Journal of Health Economics

Volym

16

Issue

4

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Elsevier

Ämne

  • Health Care Service and Management, Health Policy and Services and Health Economy

Nyckelord

  • Bayesian equilibrium
  • Genetic tests
  • Informativeness
  • Value of information

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 1879-1646