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Genetic Information and Investment in Human Capital

Publiceringsår: 1997
Språk: Engelska
Sidor: 435-452
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: Journal of Health Economics
Volym: 16
Nummer: 4
Dokumenttyp: Artikel
Förlag: Esevier


In a game of incomplete information we analyze the consequences of giving an employer access to imperfect genetic information about his employees. The employer chooses whether to invest in the employee and the employee chooses a life style. We derive the condition for markets of information services to exist and the conditions for when it is beneficial to the various parties. In one specification of the game, the mere introduction of the information service may change the employee's choice of health behavior, which means that the value of genetic information may be negative to the employer.



  • Business and Economics
  • Bayesian equilibrium
  • Genetic tests
  • Informativeness
  • Value of information


  • ISSN: 1879-1646

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