Webbläsaren som du använder stöds inte av denna webbplats. Alla versioner av Internet Explorer stöds inte längre, av oss eller Microsoft (läs mer här: * https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Var god och använd en modern webbläsare för att ta del av denna webbplats, som t.ex. nyaste versioner av Edge, Chrome, Firefox eller Safari osv.

Incommensurability and Vagueness

Författare

Summary, in English

Two items are commensurable in value if and only if one of them is better than the other or if they are equally as good. They are incommensurable if none of these relations obtains. Given incommensurability, not even a purely ordinal measure is available for comparison: We cannot represent the relationship between the items by assigning a number to each that specifies the position of that item in the value ordering.

This paper casts doubts on John Broome’s argument that vagueness in value comparisons crowds out incommensurability. It also shows how vagueness can be injected into a formal model of value relations that has room for different types of incommensurability. The model implements some basic insights of the ‘fitting attitudes’-analysis of value.

Avdelning/ar

Publiceringsår

2009

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

71-94

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

Volym

83

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Oxford University Press

Ämne

  • Philosophy

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 1467-9264