Ethical Theories and the Transparency Condition
Författare
Summary, in English
Following John Rawls, writers like Bernard Williams and Christine Korsgaard have suggested that a transparency condition should be put on ethical theories. The exact nature of such a condition and its implications is however not anything on which there is any consensus. It is argued here that the ultimate rationale of transparency conditions is epistemic rather than substantively moral, but also that it clearly connects to substantive concerns about moral psychology. Finally, it is argued that once a satisfactory form of the transparency condition is formulated, then, at least among the main contenders within ethical theory, it speaks in favor of a broadly Aristotelian approach to ethical theorizing.
Avdelning/ar
Publiceringsår
2009
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
449-462
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Volym
12
Issue
5
Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
Springer
Ämne
- Philosophy
Nyckelord
- Transparency
- Practicality
- Moral psychology
- Ethics
- Methodology
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 1386-2820