Webbläsaren som du använder stöds inte av denna webbplats. Alla versioner av Internet Explorer stöds inte längre, av oss eller Microsoft (läs mer här: * https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Var god och använd en modern webbläsare för att ta del av denna webbplats, som t.ex. nyaste versioner av Edge, Chrome, Firefox eller Safari osv.

Defending Fundamental Requirements of Practical Reason: A Constitutivist Framework

Författare

Summary, in English

Abstract in Undetermined
In this paper I offer a partial defense of a constitutivist view according to which it is possible to defend fundamental requirements of practical reason by appeal to facts about what is constitutive of rational agency. I show how it is possible for that approach to circumvent the 'is'/'ought' problem as well as the requirement that it be possible to act contrary to practical reason. But I do not attempt to establish any particular fundamental requirement. The key ideas are that such a requirement is not genuine if it is arbitrary, and that it is arbitrary just in case (a) it needs explanation and (b) that explanation could not, even in principle, be provided.

Avdelning/ar

Publiceringsår

2011

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

77-102

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Journal of Philosophical Research

Volym

36

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Philosophy Documentation Center

Ämne

  • Philosophy

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 1053-8364