Is moral internalism supported by folk intuitions?
Författare
Summary, in English
In the metaethical debate on moral internalism and externalism, appeal is constantly made to people’s intuitions about the connection between moral judgments and motivation. However, internalists and externalists disagree considerably about their content. In this paper, we present an empirical study of laymen’s intuitions about this connection. We found that they lend surprisingly little support to the most celebrated versions of internalism, which provide reasons to be skeptical of the evidential basis for these views.
Avdelning/ar
Publiceringsår
2013
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
319-335
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Philosophical Psychology
Volym
26
Issue
3
Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
Taylor & Francis
Ämne
- Psychology
Nyckelord
- Internalism
- Externalism
- Moral Judgment
- Moral Motivation
- Experimental Philosophy
- Intuition
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 1465-394X