Publikationer
On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria
Avdelning/ar:
Publiceringsår: 2012
Språk: Engelska
Sidor: 504-507
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: Economics Letters
Volym: 115
Nummer: 3
Dokumenttyp: Artikel
Förlag: Elsevier Science SA
Sammanfattning
In this paper, we demonstrate that the existence of sequential equilibria may depend on the players holding beliefs which are tailored to the respective equilibrium but otherwise difficult to justify. We also discuss potential remedies. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Disputation
Nyckelord
- Business and Economics
- Beliefs
- Sequential equilibrium
- Existence
Övrigt
Published
Yes
- ISSN: 0165-1765
