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Rule-Following, Meaning Constitution and Enaction

In English

Författare

Summary, in English

The paper submits a criticism of the standard formulation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox. According to the standard formulation, influenced by Kripke, the paradox invites us to consider what mental or behavioral items could constitute meaning. The author proposes instead an enactivist understanding of the paradox. On this account there is no essential gap between mental items and behavioral patterns such that the paradox enforces a choice between meaning being constituted either internally ‘in mind,’ or externally ‘in behavior.’ The paper begins with an introduction to the paradox and then presents arguments against standard solutions. It ends with the enactivist proposal, admitting that although much more needs to be said before it can be established as a full-fledged alternative, it nonetheless holds some promise both for revising our understanding of the paradox and for the formulation of a novel solution.

Avdelning/ar

Publiceringsår

2015

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

110-120

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Human Affairs

Volym

25

Issue

1

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

De Gruyter

Ämne

  • Philosophy

Nyckelord

  • Wittgenstein
  • Rule-following
  • Meaning
  • Enaction
  • Interaction

Status

Published

Forskningsgrupp

  • CogComlab

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 1337-401X