Speech is Silver; Silence is Golden
Författare
Summary, in English
This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds strong indications of such free-riding. Firstly,the subjects wait for others to send a message when communication is costly, which does not happen when communication is costless. Secondly, the proportion of games where no communication or one-way communication takes place is much higher when
communication is costly compared to when it is free.
communication is costly compared to when it is free.
Avdelning/ar
Publiceringsår
2013
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
497-507
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Games
Volym
4
Issue
3
Fulltext
- Available as PDF - 120 kB
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Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
MDPI AG
Ämne
- Economics
Nyckelord
- free-riding
- communication
- coordination
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 2073-4336