Webbläsaren som du använder stöds inte av denna webbplats. Alla versioner av Internet Explorer stöds inte längre, av oss eller Microsoft (läs mer här: * https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Var god och använd en modern webbläsare för att ta del av denna webbplats, som t.ex. nyaste versioner av Edge, Chrome, Firefox eller Safari osv.

Causally Redundant Social Objects: Rejoinder to Elder-Vass

Författare

Summary, in English

In Elder-Vass’s response to my (2014) it is maintained: (1) that a social object is not identical with but is merely composed of its suitably interrelated parts; (2) that a social object is necessarily indistinguishable in terms of its causal capacities from its interrelated parts; and (3) that ontological individualism lacks an adequate ontological justification (Elder-Vass forthcoming). In this reply, I argue that in view of (1) the so-called redescription principle defended by Elder-Vass ought to be reformulated and renamed; that the conjunction of (1) and (2) renders social objects causally redundant; and that ontological individualism can be coherently formulated and theoretically justified within Elder-Vass’s own metaphysics of objects with causal powers.

Avdelning/ar

Publiceringsår

2014

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

798-809

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Philosophy of the Social Sciences

Volym

44

Issue

6

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

SAGE Publications

Ämne

  • Philosophy

Nyckelord

  • causal power
  • critical realism
  • emergence
  • mereology
  • ontological individualism
  • social structure

Status

Published

Projekt

  • Social Ontology and Theories of Persistence
  • Metaphysics and Collectivity

Forskningsgrupp

  • Metaphysics and Collectivity

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 0048-3931