Causally Redundant Social Objects: Rejoinder to Elder-Vass
Författare
Summary, in English
In Elder-Vass’s response to my (2014) it is maintained: (1) that a social object is not identical with but is merely composed of its suitably interrelated parts; (2) that a social object is necessarily indistinguishable in terms of its causal capacities from its interrelated parts; and (3) that ontological individualism lacks an adequate ontological justification (Elder-Vass forthcoming). In this reply, I argue that in view of (1) the so-called redescription principle defended by Elder-Vass ought to be reformulated and renamed; that the conjunction of (1) and (2) renders social objects causally redundant; and that ontological individualism can be coherently formulated and theoretically justified within Elder-Vass’s own metaphysics of objects with causal powers.
Avdelning/ar
- Teoretisk filosofi
- Metaphysics and Collectivity
Publiceringsår
2014
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
798-809
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Philosophy of the Social Sciences
Volym
44
Issue
6
Fulltext
- Available as PDF - 298 kB
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Länkar
Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
SAGE Publications
Ämne
- Philosophy
Nyckelord
- causal power
- critical realism
- emergence
- mereology
- ontological individualism
- social structure
Status
Published
Projekt
- Social Ontology and Theories of Persistence
- Metaphysics and Collectivity
Forskningsgrupp
- Metaphysics and Collectivity
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 0048-3931