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Sales Maximization or Profit Maximization? How State Shareholders Discipline their CEOs in China*

In English

Författare

  • Sonja Opper
  • Sonia Wong
  • Yong Yang

Summary, in English

This study examines the determinants of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover in Chinese state-owned firms. Based on a sample of 1 555 turnover cases among listed firms in China during the period 19992003, we obtain three main results. First, CEO turnover is negatively related to the sales performance but not the profitability of the core business. Second, the negative relationship between CEO turnover and sales is stronger for firms with excessive employment and higher organizational slack. Third, there is a significant post-turnover increase in sales but a decline in profitability of the core business. Overall, our evidence suggests that state shareholders put a greater emphasis on sales generation than on profitability when they monitor their CEOs.

Publiceringsår

2012

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

347-375

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies

Volym

41

Issue

3

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Wiley-Blackwell

Ämne

  • Economics

Nyckelord

  • State ownership
  • Managerial monitoring
  • China's listed firms
  • G3
  • L2

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 2041-9945