Grim, Omniscience, and Cantor's Theorem
Författare
Summary, in English
Although recent evidence is somewhat ambiguous, if not confusing, Patrick Grim still seems to believe that his Cantorian argument against omniscience is sound. According to this argument, it follows by Cantor’s power set theorem that there can be no set of all truths. Hence, assuming that omniscience presupposes precisely such a set, there can be no omniscient being. Reconsidering this argument, however, guided in particular by Alvin Plantinga’s critique thereof, I find it far from convincing. Not only does it have an enormously untoward side effect, but it is self-referentially incoherent as well.
Avdelning/ar
Publiceringsår
2013
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
211-223
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Forum Philosophicum
Volym
17
Issue
2
Länkar
Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie
Ämne
- Religious Studies
Nyckelord
- Cantor's Theorem
- Patrick Grim
- Omniscience
- Self-Referential Incoherence
- Set Theoretical Paradoxes
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 1426-1898