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Grim, Omniscience, and Cantor's Theorem

Författare

Summary, in English

Although recent evidence is somewhat ambiguous, if not confusing, Patrick Grim still seems to believe that his Cantorian argument against omniscience is sound. According to this argument, it follows by Cantor’s power set theorem that there can be no set of all truths. Hence, assuming that omniscience presupposes precisely such a set, there can be no omniscient being. Reconsidering this argument, however, guided in particular by Alvin Plantinga’s critique thereof, I find it far from convincing. Not only does it have an enormously untoward side effect, but it is self-referentially incoherent as well.

Avdelning/ar

Publiceringsår

2013

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

211-223

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Forum Philosophicum

Volym

17

Issue

2

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie

Ämne

  • Religious Studies

Nyckelord

  • Cantor's Theorem
  • Patrick Grim
  • Omniscience
  • Self-Referential Incoherence
  • Set Theoretical Paradoxes

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 1426-1898