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Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain

Publiceringsår: 2006
Språk: Engelska
Sidor: 272-287
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: Mathematical Social Sciences
Volym: 52
Nummer: 3
Dokumenttyp: Artikel
Förlag: Elsevier Science B.V.

Sammanfattning

In analyses of strategy-proof voting, two results feature prominently: the dictatorial characterization contained in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem and the voting by committees characterization in the Barbera-Sonnenschein-Zhou theorem. The two theorems are based on voting procedures defined on the domain of strict preferences. In the present study, we derive corresponding results for voting schemes defined on the full domain of weak preferences and obtain a characterization by means of a combination of sequential dictatorship and voting by extended committees.

Disputation

Nyckelord

  • Business and Economics
  • Barbers-Sonnenschein-Zhou theorem
  • strategy-proof voting
  • Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

Övriga

Published
Yes
  • ISSN: 0165-4896

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