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Representation and Self-Awareness in Intentional Agents

In English

Författare

Summary, in English

Several conditions for being an intrinsically intentional agent are put forward. On a first level of intentionality the agent has representations. Two kinds are described: cued and detached. An agent with both kinds is able to represent both what is prompted by the context and what is absent from it. An intermediate level of intentionality is achieved by having an inner world, that is, a coherent system of detached representations that model the world. The inner world is used, e.g., for conditional and counterfactual thinking. Contextual or indexical representations are necessary in order that the inner world relates to the actual external world and thus can be used as a basis for action. To have fullblown intentionality, the agent should also have a detached self-awareness, that is, be able to entertain self-representations that are independent of the context.

Publiceringsår

1999

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

89-104

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Synthese

Volym

118

Issue

1

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Springer

Ämne

  • Philosophy

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 0039-7857