From reasonable preferences, via argumentation, to logic

Summary, in English

This article demonstrates that typical restrictions which are imposed in dialogical logic in order to recover first-order logical consequence from a fragment of natural language argumentation are also forthcoming from preference profiles of boundedly rational players, provided that these players instantiate a specific player type and compute partial strategies. We present two structural rules, which are formulated similarly to closure rules for tableaux proofs that restrict players' strategies to a mapping between games in extensive forms (i.e., game trees) and proof trees. Both rules are motivated from players' preferences and limitations; they can therefore be viewed as being player-self-imposable. First-order logical consequence is thus shown to result from playing a specific type of argumentation game. The alignment of such games with the normative model of the Pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation is positively evaluated. But explicit rules to guarantee that the argumentation game instantiates first-order logical consequence have now become gratuitous, since their normative content arises directly from players' preferences and limitations. A similar naturalization for non-classical logics is discussed.

• Författare: Justine Jacot; Emmanuel Genot; Frank Zenker
• Avdelning/ar: Teoretisk filosofi; Lund University Information Quality Research Group (LUIQ); CogComlab
• Publiceringsår: 2016
• Språk: Engelska
• Sidor: 105-128
• Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: Journal of Applied Logic
• Volym: 18
• Länkar: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S157086831630043X; http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2016.08.001
• Dokumenttyp: Artikel i tidskrift
• Förlag: Elsevier
• Ämne: Philosophy
• Nyckelord: Pragma-dialectics; Game semantics; Logic
• Status: Published
• Forskningsgrupp: Lund University Information Quality Research Group (LUIQ); CogComlab
• ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt: ISSN: 1570-8683