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Intuition and ex-post facto reasoning in moral judgment: Some experimental findings

Publiceringsår: 2004
Språk: Engelska
Sidor: 15
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: LPR. Lund philosophy reports 2004:1. Patterns of value. Essays on formal axiology and value analysis, vol. 2, pp 36-50.
Dokumenttyp: Rapport
Förlag: Lund University, Department of Philosophy

Sammanfattning

Psychological theories have traditionally assumed that moral judgment is caused by a reasoning process. This idea was challenged in two experiments. In the first participants were asked to make judgments in tasks set up to produce a conflict between intuition and reason. In the second, participants made judgments of morally questionable actions that were described either in a vividly disgusting way or in a less disgusting way, to investigate the effects on moral judgment of irrelevant disgust. Results suggest that moral judgment can be based on intuition and that reasoning may serve as ex-post facto justification of the judgment.

Disputation

Nyckelord

  • Social Sciences

Övriga

Published
2004:1
  • ISSN: 1404-3718

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