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Dynamics in network games with local coordination and global congestion effects

In English

Författare

Summary, in English

Several strategic interactions over social networks display both negative and positive externalities at the same time. E.g., participation to a social media website with limited resources is more appealing the more of your friends participate, while a large total number of participants may slow down the website (because of congestion effects) thus making it less appealing. Similarly, while there are often incentives to choose the same telephone company as the friends and relatives with whom you interact the most frequently, concentration of the market share in the hands of a single firm typically leads to higher costs because of the lack of competition. In this work, we study evolutionary dynamics in network games where the payoff of each player is influenced both by the actions of her neighbors in the network, and by the aggregate of the actions of all the players in the network. In particular, we consider cases where the payoff increases in the number of neighbors who choose the same action (local coordination effect) and decreases in the total number of players choosing the same action (global congestion effect). We study noisy best-response dynamics in networks which are the union of two complete graphs, and prove that the asymptotic behavior of the invariant probability distribution is characterized by two phase transitions with respect to a parameter measuring the relative strength of the local coordination with respect to the global congestion effects. Extensions to random networks with strong community structure are studied through simulations.

Publiceringsår

2015-02-11

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

2100-2105

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

2014 IEEE 53rd Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC 2014)

Volym

2015-February

Dokumenttyp

Konferensbidrag

Förlag

IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

Ämne

  • Control Engineering

Nyckelord

  • congestion games
  • coordination games
  • evolutionary dynamics
  • network games

Conference name

2014 53rd IEEE Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2014

Conference date

2014-12-15 - 2014-12-17

Conference place

Los Angeles, United States

Status

Published

Forskningsgrupp

  • LCCC

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISBN: 9781467360890