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Is there a way for constructivism to distinguish what we experience from what we represent?

In English

Författare

Redaktör

  • Alexander Riegler
  • Markus Peschl

Summary, in English

When constructivism gives up reality as a way of accounting for representations it looses a powerful tool of explanation. Why do we have the representations we have? How are they interrelated? This article attempts to investigate what possible means a constructivistic theory has to maintain the distinction between representations and experience, between memory and imagination, and between correct and mistaken perceptions. Phenomenological qualities and coherence are the solutions advocated, but how they are combined will have an impact on what sort of constructivistic theories that can be maintained.

Publiceringsår

1997

Språk

Engelska

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Understanding Representation in the Cognitive Sciences - Does Representation Need Reality?

Dokumenttyp

Konferensbidrag

Förlag

ASoCS Report 97-01

Ämne

  • Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology)
  • Philosophy

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISBN: 0306462869