Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited

Summary, in English

This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, Under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

• Författare: Tommy Andersson; Lars-Gunnar Svensson
• Avdelning/ar: Nationalekonomiska institutionen
• Publiceringsår: 2008
• Språk: Engelska
• Sidor: 350-354
• Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: Mathematical Social Sciences
• Volym: 56
• Issue: 3
• Länkar: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.05.004
• Dokumenttyp: Artikel i tidskrift
• Förlag: Elsevier
• Ämne: Economics
• Nyckelord: Coalitionally strategy-proofness; Fairness; Indivisibles
• Status: Published
• ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt: ISSN: 0165-4896