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The defeasible nature of coherentist justification

In English

Författare

  • Staffan Angere

Summary, in English

The impossibility results of Bovens and Hartmann (2003, Bayesian epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press) and Olsson (2005, Against coherence: Truth, probability and justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) show that the link between coherence and probability is not as strong as some have supposed. This paper is an attempt to bring out a way in which coherence reasoning nevertheless can be justified, based on the idea that, even if it does not provide an infallible guide to probability, it can give us an indication thereof. It is further shown that this actually is the case, for several of the coherence measures discussed in the literature so far. We also discuss how this affects the possibility to use coherence as a means of epistemic justification.

Avdelning/ar

Publiceringsår

2007

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

321-335

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Synthese

Volym

157

Issue

3

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Springer

Ämne

  • Philosophy

Nyckelord

  • defeasible justification
  • measure theory
  • Coherence

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 0039-7857