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A representation theorem for voting with logical consequences

In English

Författare

Summary, in English

This paper concerns voting with logical consequences, which means that anybody voting for an alternative x should vote for the logical consequences of x as well. Similarly, the social choice set is also supposed to be closed under logical consequences. The central result of the paper is that, given a set of fairly natural conditions, the only social choice functions that satisfy social logical closure are oligarchic (where a subset of the voters are decisive for the social choice). The set of conditions needed for the proof include a version of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives that also plays a central role in Arrow's impossibility theorem.

Publiceringsår

2006

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

181-190

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Economics and Philosophy

Volym

22

Issue

2

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Cambridge University Press

Ämne

  • Learning
  • General Language Studies and Linguistics

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 0266-2671