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Just because it’s disgusting does make it more wrong: Level of disgust affects moral judgment.

Författare

Summary, in English

Three experiments were conducted to investigate the impact of affect on moral judgment. Participants read stories describing morally questionable actions and made judgments of wrongness. Judgments were affected by morally irrelevant disgust, and the effect was moderated by individual differences in disgust sensitivity and preferred processing mode. More specifically, the effect was stronger for participants high in disgust sensitivity, particularly when low in self-reported use of systematic reasoning. Furthermore, the effect was stronger for participants high in use of intuition. As opposed to the usual focus in moral psychology on reasoning and its causal role for moral judgment, the findings are interpreted in terms of a dual process framework and the importance of individual difference variables in moral judgment research is emphasized.

Publiceringsår

2004

Språk

Engelska

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Lund Psychological Reports

Dokumenttyp

Rapport

Förlag

Department of Psychology, Lund University

Ämne

  • Psychology

Nyckelord

  • moral judgement
  • disgust
  • intuition
  • cognition
  • affect

Status

Published

Report number

Vol 5 no 3

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 1404-8035