Webbläsaren som du använder stöds inte av denna webbplats. Alla versioner av Internet Explorer stöds inte längre, av oss eller Microsoft (läs mer här: * https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Var god och använd en modern webbläsare för att ta del av denna webbplats, som t.ex. nyaste versioner av Edge, Chrome, Firefox eller Safari osv.

Prioritarianism for Prospects

In English

Författare

Summary, in English

The Interpersonal Addition Theorem, due to John Broome, states that, given certain seemingly innocuous assumptions, the overall utility of an uncertain prospect can be represented as the sum of its individual (expected) utilities. Given ‘Bernoulli’s hypothesis’, according to which individual utility coincides with individual welfare, this results appears to be incompatible with the Priority View. On that view, due to Derek Parfit, the benefits to the worse off should count for more, in the overall evaluation, than the comparable benefits to the better off. Pace Broome, the paper argues that prioritarians should meet this challenge not by denying Bernoulli’s hypothesis, but by rejecting one of the basic assumptions behind the addition theorem: that a prospect is better overall if it is better for everyone. This conclusion follows if one interprets the priority weights that are imposed by prioritarians as relevant only to moral, but not to prudential, evaluations of prospects.

Avdelning/ar

Publiceringsår

2002

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

2-21

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Utilitas

Volym

14

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Cambridge University Press

Ämne

  • Philosophy

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 0953-8208