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Ethical Theories and the Transparency Condition

In English

Författare

Summary, in English

Following John Rawls, writers like Bernard Williams and Christine Korsgaard have suggested that a transparency condition should be put on ethical theories. The exact nature of such a condition and its implications is however not anything on which there is any consensus. It is argued here that the ultimate rationale of transparency conditions is epistemic rather than substantively moral, but also that it clearly connects to substantive concerns about moral psychology. Finally, it is argued that once a satisfactory form of the transparency condition is formulated, then, at least among the main contenders within ethical theory, it speaks in favor of a broadly Aristotelian approach to ethical theorizing.

Avdelning/ar

Publiceringsår

2009

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

449-462

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

Volym

12

Issue

5

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Springer

Ämne

  • Philosophy

Nyckelord

  • Transparency
  • Practicality
  • Moral psychology
  • Ethics
  • Methodology

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 1386-2820